[OTR-users] OTR-users Digest, Vol 13, Issue 4

Eugene Y. Vasserman eyv at cs.umn.edu
Fri Jul 17 22:41:51 EDT 2009


I have it on good authority that the TPM was never meant to protect from
hardware attack similar to the type you describe, such as freezing and
then de-packaging the chip. In fact, if you wanted to get at the
"private" communication between the TPM and the processor, all you have
to do is attach a probe to the system bus. Probing the bus does not get
you TPM keys, but it *does* give you access to decrypted content. Does
anyone know for a fact if I'm wrong?

Eugene

> Depends on the TPM. They're supposed to be able to detect violent
> environmental changes and react if they consider that an attack.
> 
> On 7/17/09, Tim Clark <crashnet at hotmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>>> >> Not quite. That's what hardware keyloggers are for.
>>> >> To further improve security you can use a notebook with TPM and secure
>>> >> your bootloader and BIOS with it.
>>> >> Never let your notebook out of sight and do not use an external keyboard.
>> >
>> > i remember reading something that TPM could be defeated by applying freezing
>> > spray on the TPM chip?
>> >
>> > Tim



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