[OTR-users] Stronger crypto?

[Jonathan Schleifer]

Hi!

I looked at the specification of the OTR protocol and have a few
suggestions.

First: Why not move from AES128-CTR to AES256-CBC? It only needs a few
cycles more, but provides stronger crypto. Shouldn't be a problem, even
on slower machines.

Second: Why not increase the public/private key to 4096 bit? DSA2 can
handle that. And since that key isn't generated every 5 minutes,
performance on slow machines shouldn't be an issue here either.

I haven't read the whole specification, only had a quick look at it, so
feel free to correct me if I've missed something.

I'd welcome it if there'd be a new OTR version providing stronger cryto.

-- 
Jonathan
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