[OTR-users] DH moduli & AES keysize

[Ian Goldberg]

On Tue, Mar 29, 2005 at 07:34:38AM -0500, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> The hard part is of course not in using a different value of p.  1536
> bits was chosen so as to reduce message latency and size overhead, while
                                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> providing sufficient security.

You're focusing on the latency, and forgetting about the size.  Using a
4096-bit key instead of 1536-bit will remove 320 bytes from the
available message size, which is already pretty small for some IM
protocols (around 500 bytes or so for ICQ, I think).  You could add
fragmentation to the OTR protocol, at the cost of even more overhead.

You really think 1536-bit discrete logs will be calculable any time
soon?

I'll just say again that this change isn't on my personal priority list.
But hey, it's open-source, right?  ;-)

   - Ian