[OTR-users] OTR mentioned in Snowden documents?

[Mike Minor]

On Sep 10, 2013, at 3:01 PM, Kat Hanna <kat at paip.net> wrote:

> On Mon, 9 Sep 2013, Mike Minor wrote:
> 
>> On Sep 6, 2013, at 8:28 PM, Paul Wouters <paul at cypherpunks.ca> wrote:
>> 
>>> On Fri, 6 Sep 2013, Mike Minor wrote:
>>> 
>>>> "Encrypted chat - Available with chat programs like Adium or with software added to programs like AOL Instant Messenger, providing 'end to end' encryption, in which the data cannot be decrypted at any point along the transfer (even by the messaging service)."
>>> 
>>>> If the NSA is claiming they can decrypt OTR, what possible attack vectors do the readers of this mailing list suppose could be viable targets?  Our OS? Our RNG's? Our CPU's?
>>> 
>>> I bet most people, when seeing OTR problems (like the old multi-client
>>> OTR wars) will disable OTR so they can talk. That's simply the only
>>> thing the NSA needs to do for most people. Just scramble the packets.
>>> 
>>> Paul
>> 
>> It appears the NSA mentions OTR in relation to mass, passive surveillance, not an active attack.
> 
> I don't know that the reporting has been precise enough to tell if
> they're actually breaking OTR or its underlying crypto. The text you
> quote comes from (AFAICT--I haven't been through all of the docs) an
> infographic[1] with the introduction, "Below are encryption tools the
> N.S.A. has had some success in cracking, according to documents provided
> by Edward J. Snowden describing the agency’s code-breaking
> capabilities." That "some success" doesn't necessarily suggest a full
> break to me, but again, we just don't know. It seems to me that that
> could refer to targeted attacks on the OS or app.
> 
> I'm not a fan of appeals to authority, but one clue we do have is that
> Bruce Schneier, who has seen the docs, still recommends OTR[2].
> 
> On the other hand, I've seen tweets from Guardian people (not Greenwald,
> but another reporter--sorry, that's the extent of my memory right now)
> that the details about weak or broken algorithms that various security
> people have been exhorting them to publish are details that they simply
> don't have. Or that they haven't yet found within the docs. So it's
> possible that Bruce doesn't know for sure, either.
> 
> Again, I haven't read all of the source docs, and I haven't yet seen the
> slides that people have been pulling from the Fantastico broadcast, so
> if you have more specific info, please point to it. But I think we just
> don't know. Which isn't very comforting.
> 
> -Kat
> 
> [1] http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/unlocking-private-communications.html?ref=us
> [2] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance

I think you and I are on the same page…

My post was to, at least, make the OTR community aware that OTR is alluded to in the Snowden docs in relation to a decryption success.  Anything more is speculation - but speculation that I think we must partake in.