[OTR-users] Visible Metadata?

[Mike Hearn]

The metadata leaked is the same as for a regular instant messaging
conversation. For someone with raw IP access and nothing else, this often
won't reveal much - consider the case of two Google Talk users who use OTR
with each other. All a network sniffer sees is two encrypted and
independent connections to Google datacenters.

However, if you assume that the NSA can get access to server logs of your
IM network, then of course they can find out that two people were
communicating and that they used OTR to do so.

For something designed to resist traffic analysis and provide forward
secrecy, take a look at Pond:

https://pond.imperialviolet.org/

However it's an email-like system and not an IM network.


On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Robert Pollak <robert.pollak at gmail.com>wrote:

> Hello list,
>
> I am new to OTR messaging, and I have got a question:
>
> Do I understand correctly that the use of OTR messaging does not hide
> (e.g. from the NSA or other network sniffers :) the fact that some
> encrypted communication has taken place between two visible IP
> adresses?
>
> (So far, It have found Bitmessage as the only approach to hide this
> metadata, but OTOH there is no forward secrecy with Bitmessage.)
>
> Robert
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> OTR-users at lists.cypherpunks.ca
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>
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