[OTR-users] multi-party OTR communications? (and other OTR details)

[Brian Morrison]

Ian Goldberg wrote:

> OTR offers the same level deniability as plaintext.  But it also offers
> strong authentication *during* the conversation.  If you used
> pidgin-encryption, for example, every message is digitally signed, which
> would certainly give you *less* deniability than plaintext.

I would say it has much higher deniability than plaintext, in the sense
of "You said <thing>" whereas you can say "I said something, but you do
not know what it was". The really important aspect is the ephemeral
keys, so you can never recover the plaintext if neither party keeps
logs. In the UK, with legally enforceable GAP (or GAK under duress as
usually computers are seized) this is important as you can truthfully
claim that you do not have, and never had, access to the session key. So
intercepts don't work.

> 
>> I guess what i'm saying is that the deniability feature of OTR is not
>> as high a priority for me as the other features (such as IM-layer
>> protocol independence, remote-party authentication (including SMP),
>> and a clear, simple UI).
> 
> You are in the majority.  ;-)

All these things are good, but being able to legally frustrate intrusive
surveillance is also good. A small step to removing the mobile prison
the idiot politicians seem determined to put us all in.

-- 

Brian