[OTR-users] otr support in gajim?

[Jonathan Schleifer]

Ian Goldberg <ian at cypherpunks.ca> wrote:
 
> SAS can't be checked in-band; a MITM could just substitute the in-band
> values.

Oh, sorry, I understood in-band as in in-client, not as in inside the
conversation. That - of course - does not work, as it would compromise
security.

> Not quite; OTR allows a prearranged shared secret (of your choice) to
> be used to authenticate your buddy.  With SAS, you have to first
> generate your keys, then exchange the 5-character short random
> strings.

With ESessions, you don't even need keys :) You just use a shared
secret and no keys (you can use keys, but the simplified ESessions XEP
doesn't require them).

> Hmm?  There have been formal analyses of the security of the OTR
> protocol.  Is there something in particular you'd like to see that's
> missing?

I don't want to see anything, it are developers of other clients who
first want to see a real cryptanalysis on the protocol like it has been
done for TLS and this is why soon TLS will be used for client to client
encryption in XMPP :(.

-- 
Jonathan
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 801 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/pipermail/otr-users/attachments/20081113/2d0c2621/attachment.pgp>