[OTR-users] Progress on OTR flaws

[Gregory Maxwell]

On 6/28/06, Alex <alex323 at gmail.com> wrote:
> Has there been any new development on OTR which addresses the flaws
> outlined in "Finite-State Security Analysis of OTR Version 2"?

I'd be more interested in seeing a reply than 'fixes' ... some of the
flaws they found are in my eyes not actually flaws.

For example they show a a third party with complete control of the
network can prevent a forth party from obtaining the correct MAC keys
needed to forge the discussion. They claim that this breaks the strong
denyability aspect of OTR, but I disagree. It is immaterial if the
forth party could have forged the messages because the messages could
have been forged by the third party (or by either of the folks
communicating).