[OTR-dev] OMEMO, PFS

[Greg Troxel]

Thijs Alkemade <me at thijsalkema.de> writes:

> Suppose Bob's ephemeral keys are compromised by an attacker at a specific
> time, then the attacker can decrypt all messages from Alice since the last
> time Bob sent Alice a message before the compromise, up to (and including? I'm
> not clear on that) the first time Bob sent a message after the compromise.
> Once Bob sends a new message, the key material changes and the ephemeral key
> becomes useless.

Thanks.  That makes perfect sense.   So you have PFS that has issues in
time, but reset once you ratchet forward -- and actually erase the
previous cases from all places in which they were persisted.
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