[OTR-dev] Fwd: Some DH groups found weak; is OTR vulnerable?

[Holger Levsen]

Hi Ian,

On Freitag, 22. Mai 2015, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> No, there is no reason to believe that the 1536-bit DH group used by OTR
> is vulnerable.

is it really a single group for all? how about (optionally) creating a new, 
client specific one, on installation? and how about using eg. 4096 bits?

if I understand correctly, in a few years 1536 bits might not give sufficient 
protection anymore, if attacked liked this, and if there is a a full take of 
the otr communication then the "forward secrecy" is gone :/


cheers,
	Holger
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