Sat Jun 28 11:42:51 EDT 2014
message integrity failure. But from what Ian has said, the libotr
implementation is secure, but the spec is not. So it seems that the
major action item is to rev the spec to match the implementation.
On 4/25/06, Andrew S. Morrison <asm at cs.stanford.edu> wrote:
> I'm still around to discuss the analysis with anyone willing to listen to
> me :)
> Andrew S. Morrison
> asm at cs.stanford.edu
> (650) 575 9261
> On 0, Rich Griffin <rich.griffin at gmail.com> wrote:
> > All:
> > Does anyone know what the action items are in response to the OTR
> > security analysis (http://www.stanford.edu/~amo/otr_analysis.pdf)?
> > Can these issues be addressed? Is there a roadmap for this?
> > I'm not at all being critical, just very eager to enjoy the use of the
> > nicest security system I've yet seen.
> > Anxiously awaiting,
> > --
> > Rich Griffin
> > _______________________________________________
> > OTR-dev mailing list
> > OTR-dev at lists.cypherpunks.ca
> > http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev
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