[OTR-dev] Are the security issues outlined in the 2005 Raimondo paper fixed?

[Greg]

On Nov 10, 2013, at 4:16 AM, Kjell Braden <afflux at pentabarf.de> wrote:
> Hi Greg,
> 
> the paper appears to apply to a signed DH key exchange as it was used
> in OTRv1. It was replaced by a SIGMA AKE (which given as an alternative
> in the paper) in OTRv2, so my understanding is that this issue is fixed.

Thanks Kjell!

Cheers,
Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.
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