[OTR-dev] Is "Version rollback" attack fixed in 4.0?

[Ague Mill]

Hi!

I am glad to see OTR development (visibly) moving foward again! :)

From a quick look at commit logs in libotr repository, I have not
been able to figure out if the future version 4.0 is still vulnerable to
the "Version rollback" attack that was described in the paper
"Finite-State Security Analysis of OTR Version 2" [1] by Joseph Bonneau
and Andrew Morrison.

[1] http://www.jbonneau.com/OTR_analysis.pdf

Has this been fixed already? And if it has not, would it be hard to
prevent two clients to switch back to an earlier version of the
protocol?

Thanks,
-- 
Ague
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