<div dir="ltr">Sorry, I wasn't clear enough about the two desirable qualities:<div><br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 2:03 PM, Callme Whatiwant <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:nejucomo@gmail.com" target="_blank">nejucomo@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im">On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 6:48 AM, Jonas Wielicki <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:otr-dev@sotecware.net" target="_blank">otr-dev@sotecware.net</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>On 02.07.2013 15:35, Kurt Roeckx wrote:<br>
> I seem to be more and more going to a PGP model, and have<br>
> to wonder if it's possible to use my GPG key for OTR.<br>
<br>
</div>Honestly I think that the absence of many of the PGP features is the<br>
strength of OTR. OTR is so incredibly easy and, in my opinion, the only<br>
current example of strong crypto done right (from the user experience<br>
perspective).<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>+N for some very large N.</div><div><br></div><div>OTR's strength *comes* from the lack of such features. If users are lead to believe "one fingerprint per (account, device)" this has two desirable qualities:</div>
<div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Quality one: Their beliefs about the implications their usage of the software are more likely to be correct.</div><div style><br></div><div style>Quality two: They are more likely to understand how to use the software.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>The second means more users, and the first means fewer security mistakes.</div><div style><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div></div><div>First, they will understand the scope of verifying a fingerprint: It is specific to a particular device and account. What if my friend's phone is stolen? If I have separate verifications for their laptop versus their phone, I don't have to know how to use any software tools whatsoever (assuming the client shows this distinction!), I simply stop trusting my friend's phone.</div>
<div><br></div><div>By contrast if there's some "tech" for associating and revoking keys, who successfully use that? Average users will not practice revocation, because it is a rare event, and so when their phone is stolen they won't know what to do. If sharing keys across devices or accounts is common (because, IMO, we've *miseducated* the user base), then what do they tell their friends? "Oh, hey, stop trusting my phone, but you should still trust my laptop access." How do they specify this?</div>
<div><br></div><div>Also, think about the usability? How do they associate keys between accounts or devices? Every client will have a different UI. Which users will get this right? Only some of them. Therefore the ecosystem will be filled with confusion: "some people share a single fingerprint among multiple accounts and/or devices, but other's do not, so now that I'm talking to my friend Alice, which category is she in?" "Alice knows how to share keys between devices/accounts, and I know she sync'd her identity between her gchat account on her phone and her laptop, but what about her home desktop?" etc...</div>
<div><br></div><div>That kind of usability confusion == making the wrong assumptions about authentication == security vuln.</div><div><br></div><div>Security is only as strong as its usability.</div><div class="im">
<div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Adding complications such as key sync, key management, revocation etc.<br>
is not what I consider useful for the general case.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>+1</div><div><br></div><div>Here's another thought experiment:</div><div><br></div><div>Count the number of people who have "correctly" verified their friends OTR fingerprint. Of those, count the ones who have "the correct" belief about the security implications and the risks they face because of that.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Now, do the same for PGP key verification. Add on key signing. Add on transitive web of trust. Add revocations.</div><div><br></div><div>It's no wonder that PGP software is unusable[1], because every implementation foists all this complexity (which I posit most users ignore) on users. My intuition is that each usability foible in the "PKI mentality" leads to first, an order of magnitude fewer attempted users, and then within that set *another order of magnitude* fewer users who have "correct" beliefs about the implications of their usage.</div>
<div><br></div><div>[1] Here, when I say "unusable" I don't mean by geeks. I mean by my mom and my non-computer friends who anecdotally have successfully used OTR but who have never successfully used PGP. The primary reason for this is that I can explain how to use OTR in about 15 minutes to my mom, but I haven't even dared to explain PGP.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I'd love to see actual empirical data about those counts above. Is anyone aware of any?</div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
regards,<br>
Jonas<br>
<div><div><br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Opinionatedly yours,</div><div>callme whatiwant</div><div class="im"><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div>
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